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In a post-modernist world where the logic of late capitalism isredefining the notion of statehood, the Liberation Tigers of Tamil
Eelam (LTTE) are fighting for Eelam - a separate State in northern
Sri Lanka. Their concept of nationhood is rooted in modernist
thinking and transcends geographic boundaries, and is inclusive
of more than 50 million Tamil speaking people scattered
throughout the world. Their diaspora is held together, and
informed of the Eelam struggle, through an elaborate propaganda
and information network which relies heavily on the Internet. This
media network also plays a vital role in de-demonising the LTTE,
and attempts to transfer its terrorist image on to the Sri Lankan
government.
Traditional media outlooks and government regulations over
the last forty years, have paved the way for both a pro-government
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Sri Lanka, the former British colony of Ceylon, is the theatre for one of
the world’s longest and bloodiest civil wars. For more than two-and-a-
half decades the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) have fought
to secure a separate Tamil state from the country’s predominantly
Sinhalese government. However, the reportage of the conflict has
remained a monopoly of the government and the pro-Sinhala mainstream
media.  This paper argues that alternative media such as the Internet
has given the LTTE and pro-liberation supporters a media outlet which
is not easily censored, shut or distorted by governments and mainstream
media groups.  The alternative rebel media, however, does not imply an
emergence of media freedom in Sri Lanka, and merely suggest the
availability of an outlet for ‘news’ usually not supported by mainstream
media. The paper does not necessarily support either the Eelam cause or
the Sri Lankan government, and merely identifies the reasons for, and
observes the successes and flaws of, web-based pro-Eelam media.
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media which acts as a quasi-propaganda machine for the
government, and a mainstream media which is not necessarily pro-
government but is usually anti-Eelam. The political views of both
groups have to a significant extent, determined the coverage of the
Eelam war. In this climate, pro-Eelam groups have turned to the
Internet, which provides them with effectively an uncensorable
medium for both LTTE propaganda and pro-Eelam news. In most
cases the pro-Eelamist’s ‘news’ is as skewed as that of the government
owned media, but nevertheless it offers an alternative news outlet
to counter or respond to ‘government propaganda’.
Sri Lanka the former British colony of Ceylon is home to more
than 19.5 million people - 74% Sinhalese and 18% Tamil (Central
Intelligence Agency, 2002). The country is also the arena for one of
the world’s longest and bloodiest civil wars - one waged between
the predominantly Sinhala government of Sri Lanka and the
Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam.
While the roots of the conflict run deep, a key turning point
was the country’s ethnic rift falls in 1976 with the signing of the
Vaddukoddai resolution (DeSilva, 1998). The resolution is central to
the conflict in that with it, Tamil politicians led by Samuel James
Vellupillai Chelvanayagam openly declared for the first time  the
need for a separate Tamil State – an Eelam nation. While
Chelvanayagam himself was a pacifist, his concept of Eelam laid
the ideological foundation for a number of youth groups which
believed in ‘fighting’ for their state as opposed to ‘demonstrating’
for it.
The Tamil New Tigers, which later become the Liberation Tigers
of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), was one of many rebels groups formed in
the 1970’s following the Vaddukoddai resolution. By the mid 1980’s
the Tigers had become the dominant militant liberation group on
the Jaffna peninsula (Swamy, 1994).
Today the LTTE is proscribed as a terrorist group in a number
of countries including Australia (2001), Britain (2001), India (1991)
and the United States (1997). The LTTE has been charged with
assassinating heads of state in two countries - Prime Minister Rajiv
Gandhi of India and President Ranasinghe Premadasa of Sri Lanka.
They are also alleged to have carried out more than 200 suicide
bombings since the 1980’s - the highest hit-rate for any terrorist group
(Schweitzer, 2000).
Government control of the media
Since the late 1950’s Sri Lankan mainstream media has been
heavily censored and controlled by the government. It was initiated
The Tamil
Struggle
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after only a decade of post-independence press freedom, when
Prime Minister Solomon West Ridgeway Dias (SWRD)
Bandaranaike responded to the 1958 communal riots by imposing
a State of Emergency, and with it, press censorship (Senadhira,
1996).
The 1956-1958 period is also considered by many political
commentators as the starting point of the ethnic rift between the
Sinhalese and Tamil people. The passage of Bandaranaike’s
controversial Official Language Act (1956), which is colloquially
known as the ‘Sinhala Only’ policy, not only linguistically sidelined
Tamil speakers in government service.  It also sparked the first
ethnic riots in post-independent Ceylon.
Following the 1958 ethnic riots Bandaranaike was able to
secure parliamentary approval for a Tamil Language (Special
Provisions) Act, and subsequently lifted both the State of
Emergency and press censorship.  But once unleashed, both racial
violence and media censorship continued to plague the island
nation for nearly half a century.
While SWRD Bandaranaike had perhaps the dubious honour
of being father of press censorship in Sri Lanka, successive
governments including that of his widow Sirimavo Bandaranaike
and Junius Richard Jayewardene, tightened their grip on the
nation’s fledgling independent media through a raft of legislation
including the Associated Newspapers of Ceylon (Special
Provisions) Act of 1973, which legitimised government control of
Sri Lanka’s largest newspaper group.
Constitutional loopholes and Parliamentary bills
which curb the press
While Jayewardene’s 1978 constitution guaranteed
fundamental rights, including those relating to “freedom of
expression”, Article 15(7) of Chapter 3, contained a legal loophole
stating that all rights may be restricted by law in “the interests of
national security, public order and the protection of public health
and morality, or for the purposes of securing due recognition and
respect for the rights and freedoms of others, or of meeting the
just requirements of the general welfare of democratic society.”
Further still, Article 16 stated that all laws “written and
unwritten” and in existence at the time, would remain valid
regardless of whether they were consistent with the fundamental
rights chapter (Law & Society Trust, 2002). Under Article 16,
Sirimavo Bandaranaike’s 1973 Sri Lanka Press Council Bill - which
established a largely state-appointed media censorship and
regulatory body - was duly incorporated to Jayewardene’s legal
and constitutional framework (Senadhira, 1996).
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The Press Council Bill also included laws on criminal
defamation – laws which have been used by successive
governments since to persecute a number of newspaper editors
including The Sunday Times editor Sinha Ratnatunga (in July 1997)
and The Sunday Leader  editor Lasantha Wickrematunga (in 2000).
Both were given suspended sentences for defaming President
Chandrika Kumaratunga (Freedom Forum, 2000).
A year after the 1978 Constitution was adopted supposedly
enshrining fundamental rights, Jayewardene enacted the
Prevention of Terrorism (Temporary Provisions) Act No. 48,
legalising the arrest of any person with or without a warrant and
permitting their detention for a period of up to 18 months without
a court order. The act was used by both Jayewardene and
subsequent governments to arrest and detain journalists.
Heavy-handed legislative controls, coupled with the forcible
closure of newspapers, and the harassment of journalists, have
made it very difficult for views opposed to those of the government
to find an objective outlet in traditional media.
For the LTTE rebels, who are anti-government by their very
nature, finding a forum to have political views heard has been
virtually impossible. Government media control meant sympathetic
(or even politically neutral) journalists were removed from areas
in close proximity to the LTTE.  Newspapers which had once been
prepared to report on the LTTE perspective were shut down. The
government stranglehold also saw many journalists interrogated
and harassed for simply interviewing LTTE representatives, while
other media personnel were banned from entering LTTE territory.
Thus the LTTE who could not freely travel to the south of the
country for interviews, could not even bring the media to them.
In July1983, the first Tamil Tiger attack on the Sri Lankan
military was followed by days of island-wide anti-Tamil ethnic
violence. President Jayewardene’s handling of the crisis was heavily
criticised by Jaffna based Sinhala journalist and editor of The
Saturday Review, Gamini Navaratne. In retaliation, the Jayewardene
government banned The Review with immediate effect.  Although
the ban was later lifted, Navaratne was required to present all of
his copy to the government censor before publication (Senadhira,
1996).
Jaffna also had thriving local newspaper culture in the early
stages of the Eelam war. In 1987 prior to the Indian Peace Keeping
Force’s (IPKF) deployment in the Tiger-held north and east, Jaffna
was home to four Tamil newspapers Murasoli, Eelamurasu,
Uthayan and Eelanadu.  Within a few months of the IPKF’s arrival,
Eelamurasu journalists were arrested and their office was destroyed
Curbing The
Jaffna Press
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(Tamilnet, 2002a). A few years later, Uthayan and Eelanadu, the
only two newspapers which survived the IPKF, were hit by a
newsprint embargo imposed by President Ranasinghe Premadasa
(1991). While Uthayan was able to successfully circumvent the
newsprint restrictions the fact remains the embargo was a clear
attempt to curb the Jaffna press. In 2000, Uthayan was banned by
the Kumaratunga government for “acting maliciously and
detrimentally in publishing information that is biased to the LTTE”
(Committee to Protect Journalists, 2000).
Consequences of interviewing the Tamil Tigers
On numerous occasions journalists have been accused of
supporting the Tigers or are branded as sympathisers simply for
interviewing the LTTE or for trying to balance government
propaganda with rebel propaganda. In 2001 Uthayan’s Deputy-
Editor, M. Vithyathara, was interrogated by police and asked to
reveal the names of those who helped him meet the LTTE
hierarchy, following the publication of an interview with the LTTE
chief negotiator the previous day (Reporters Sans Frontières,
2002a).
In January 2001, Lake House’s Valampuri/Jaffna- based
correspondent, Subramaniam Thiruchelvan, was arrested by the
Terrorist Investigation Division under the Prevention of Terrorism
Act (Reporters Sans Frontières, 2001a) for communicating with
the LTTE. In the same year Dharmaretnam Sivaram, Editor of the
on-line newspaper Tamilnet, and Ravaya journalist Vasantharaja
were denounced in state media as being LTTE spies based on their
coverage of the conflict. No formal charges were ever laid
(Reporters Sans Frontières, 2001b).
In October 2000, Mayilvaganam Nimalarajan, BBC
correspondent and a freelance journalist attached to the Tamil daily
Virakesari and the Sinhala weekly Ravaya, was also arrested for
“having links to the LTTE.”  Twelve months later, Nimalarajan
was murdered allegedly by pro-government Tamil militants of
the Eelam People’s Democratic Party. Despite a number of suspects
being arrested, media watchdog Reporters Sans Frontières claims
the investigation has been shelved.  They claim two of the key
suspects released on bail - David Michael Collins and ‘Vishua’ –
are a high flight risk and yet have not have their passports
impounded (Reporters Sans Frontières, 2002b).
Military restrictions on crossing the ‘border’
Since the mid 1980’s the government has controlled the
movement of journalists into Tiger-controlled areas. Journalists
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have been required to obtain Ministry of Defence (MOD) approval
before crossing the border – approval which is frequently denied.
As such journalists have been forced to cross the ‘border’ unofficially,
risking prosecution and harassment by the Ministry on return.
In April 2001, Marie Colvin, a veteran war correspondent for
London’s Sunday Times newspaper was severely wounded by Sri
Lankan military gunfire while returning unofficially from the Tiger-
held Wanni region (North Central Sri Lanka). The following day,
the government issued a statement claiming Colvin had overstayed
her visa and appeared to have “her own secret agenda with the
LTTE.”  Sri Lanka’s overseas missions were subsequently asked to
be “cautious when recommending journalists for visas” (Committee
to Protect Journalists, 2001). While Colvin’s charges of colluding
with the LTTE were dropped, two local people were charged with
organising her border-crossing.
For its part, the LTTE also has a long history of attempting to
control and curb the media. Jaffna-based Tamil journalist
Shanmugalingam, a reporter for Eelanadu, Eelamurasu, Murasoli and
Viduthalai was periodically harassed from1986-1989 by the Tigers
for his anti-Tiger stance.   In 1986 the LTTE successfully forced the
Eelanadu management to sack him. On 6 November 1989,
Shanmugalingam was abducted from his home by the LTTE and
later believed to have been tortured and killed (Article19, 1992).
Dr Rajani Thiranagama, a Human Rights Activist with the
University Teachers for Human Rights, was gunned down by the
LTTE on 21 September 1989. Thiranagama the head of human
anatomy at the Jaffna University was a co-author of The Broken
Palmyra, a book which documents human rights violations by the
Sri Lankan government, the LTTE and the Indian Peace Keeping
Force (Article19, 1992).
Despite denials, the LTTE is also accused of an attack on the
Batticaloa based Thinakkathir Newspaper on 8 August 2002. The
newspaper office was vandalised in the attack and equipment worth
1.2 million Sri Lankan rupees was stolen (Free Media Movement,
2002).
Mainstream media biases on the Eelam struggle
While the government is regularly criticised by non-
government news groups for its efforts to install a pro-government
bias in the media, most mainstream media itself (which is
predominantly Sinhalese-owned) has adopted a populist, anti-LTTE
bias of their own. While this does not necessarily translate to support
of the government, an ethnic-based bias against the LTTE, makes it
The Tigers
And
Mainstream
Media
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difficult again for the rebels to receive fair coverage.
Content analyses of mainstream Sri Lankan media has
revealed a Sinhala Nationalist bias in both the English and Sinhala
media. During a key battle in November 1999, when the military
was taking heavy casualties, the Sinhala press published a series
of nationalistic and emotive articles along an “our brave boys’’
line – showing clear support for the Sri Lankan army.  Meanwhile
the English paper The Daily News decided to hold the story on the
attack until something positive could be reported, eventually
announcing: “Terrorist attack on Ampakamam repulsed”. In
another case study, when government troops re-captured a Tiger
stronghold The Daily News wasted no time in reporting “Vavuniya
returns to normal” (Kandaiah, 2001).
Despite widespread media bias against the Eelam struggle,
newspapers such as Yukthiya and Ravaya have attempted to report
the conflict from a balanced point of view, and uncharacteristically
these Sinhala newspapers employ Tamil journalists for an
ethnically balanced coverage.  Yukthiya and Ravaya’s impartial
coverage is a solid step in the right direction for Sri Lankan free
media, but from the Tiger’s point of view, this neutrality limits
the papers’ usefulness in countering the strong government
propaganda and anti-Eelam bias in other traditional media.  For
the LTTE , balanced coverage in a minority of media is not enough
to counter the strong anti-Eelam bias in the majority. The Tigers
have recognised that pro-Eelam coverage in traditional media will
continue to elude them because of government restrictions,
inherent media biases and even journalist’s professional quest to
be balanced.
In view of this, pro-Eelamists have developed a sophisticated
web-based media network which makes no apologies for its
overtly pro-Eelam bias.  Their technically advanced global
network aims to ‘level the playing field’, often offering a direct
rebuttal to government and Sinhalese propaganda – but it is not
without its faults. As this paper will discuss later, the pro-Eelamists
often fail to make the most of their newfound media forum.
Eelam struggle and the rebel media
During the initial stages of the Eelam struggle, rebel media
took the form of traditional clandestine media, with pirate radio
and television broadcasts. During this early period, the rebel
groups fighting for Eelam relied on Indian government patronage,
and used radio transmitters in southern India away from the Sri
Lankan government’s reach.
In 1984 the People’s Liberation Organisation of Tamil Eelam
(PLOTE) became the first Tamil militant group to launch their
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own radio station – a service based at Ramanathapuram on the
coast of India’s southern state of Tamil Nadu. The station was
operated by Sherly Kandappa, who reported directly to the group’s
leader Uma Maheswaran – a Tamil militant and former LTTE
member (personal communication with Sivaram, 2001).
The LTTE was also using Indian-based transmission facilities
around the same time, but after the Indo-Lanka Accord and more
specifically after the LTTE was banned in India following Prime
Minister Rajiv Gandhi’s assassination, the Tigers were forced to
transmit from within Sri Lanka. Their transmissions have been
limited to Tiger-held areas and are used mainly to communicate
with people within the Eelam territory.  Their listeners rely on
dynamo-powered radios, as batteries are banned in the region under
state embargo.
Despite its relatively limited reach, Voice of Tiger (VOT) radio
is constantly targeted by the Sri Lankan airforce. The LTTE’s Nallur
radio station was destroyed during Operation Riviresa in the mid
90’s, and a second transmitter was destroyed at Nedunkeni in the
Wanni forest a few years later. In 2001 the airforce bombed VOT’s
Oddusudan station (Military reports, 2002).
The Tigers also operated a television broadcast in the Jaffna
peninsula in 1987 just prior to the IPKF deployment, and again in
1991-1993 after Indian troops were withdrawn. The station located
at Kokuvil, Jaffna was destroyed in 1993 by the Sri Lankan Airforce
(Military reports, 2002).
The LTTE’s official media
The Internet has encouraged a shift in who creates, distributes
and ultimately owns the news (Knight & Ubayasiri, 2002), and with
that shift the Internet has broken or reduced government and the
mainstream media monopolies on information. Groups such as
Eelam nationalists who have previously struggled with small
audiences, easily censored and suppressed media organisations and
a predominantly anti-Eelam stance are now able to write and
distribute ‘their own news’ through the web.
In two decades since their first communiqué in 1979, the Tiger’s
web-based media network has developed into one of the world’s
most advanced rebel media units.  It is far more advanced than any
web-based “counter-campaign that the Colombo Government has,
hitherto, been able to organise” (Chalk, 1999).
What started as a communiqué, typed on Tiger letterhead by a
supporter using a borrowed typewriter (Swamy, 1994), is now a
high-tech multi-media operation encompassing digital technology,
cyberspace and satellites.
Eelam
Struggle And
Alternative
Media
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As an example of their development, by the late 1990’s the
LTTE’s European quasi-diplomatic organisation headed by
Velummayitum Manoharan, was receiving daily battlefield reports
from the forests of Sri Lanka through satellite phone (Chalk, 1999).
These reports were then written into official Tiger press releases,
posted on-line and faxed to media agencies throughout the world.
The communiqués were officially released by the Tiger secretariat
in London, at 211 Katherine Road, and from Eelam House at 202
Long Lane. However since the LTTE’s proscription in the UK
(2001), the communiqués are now ‘officially’ issued from the
Tiger’s Wanni head office in Sri Lanka, although analysts believe
the media office’s true location is elsewhere.  The Tiger
communiqués have been available on the Tiger’s official web page
eelam.com since the mid-90’s (Tamil Eelam Homepage, 2002).
Unlike unofficial pro-Eelam sites, the Tiger’s official web site
eelam.com is a relatively basic and unobtrusive homepage. Their
online message to the international community is simple. Tiger
leader Prabaharan is quoted on the site saying that: “The Tamil
people want to maintain their national identity and to live in their
own lands, in their historically given homeland with peace and
dignity…these are the basic political aspirations of the Tamil
people. It is neither separatism nor terrorism.”
An analysis of eelam.com homepages from 1997 show the
Tigers regularly present conflicting messages on-line. While the
LTTE on the one hand talks of peace, the site regularly carries a
photograph of Tiger leader Velupillai Prabaharan in military
fatigues, and remembrances to fallen cadre which include Black
Tiger suicide bombers. Since late 2000, the starting point of the
current peace negotiations, the site has shifted its focus from LTTE
as ‘militia’ to LTTE as a ‘legitimate political organisation’, by
publishing photographs showing Tiger hierarchy rubbing
shoulders with the Norwegian envoy Erik Solheim, the Canadian
High Commissioner and Amnesty International officials. Even the
standard militia image of the Tiger leader was removed in mid-
2001, just prior to actual peace talks, and was replaced with one of
him dressed in civvies.
Unofficial pro-LTTE websites
The LTTE’s unofficial websites are far more sophisticated than
their official ones. These sites, which deny being affiliated with
the militia, play a crucial role in the Eelam media network, in that
they promote the pro-Tamil perspective as ‘public information’
or news, without the appearance of being strictly LTTE.
“Propaganda has a negative connotation and public information
has a positive one” (Carlson, 2001), or at least a neutral implication.
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For example pro-LTTE websites which attempt to disassociate
themselves from the rebel’s official organs, can publish articles
‘exposing human rights violations’ by the Sri Lankan government,
and attract a sympathetic audience without their message being
marred or undermined by the LTTE’s questionable politico-military
or violent past.
One such website is tamiltigers.net, which focuses on the Sri
Lankan government’s human rights abuses or “state terrorism”. It
claims; “Sri Lanka has the second highest number of civilian
disappearances in the world,” arguing that only Iraq is worse.
However the site makes no mention of the Tiger’s human rights
record, which many argue is equally as poor as the government’s,
and instead portrays the Tigers as freedom fighters.
Another website eelamweb.com, also purports to be committed
to exposing the government’s human rights violations, but also
openly offers a comprehensive e-commerce section, selling the
LTTE’s monthly video Oliveechu. The videos include footage of all
major Tiger attacks on Sri Lankan military and civilian targets, even
those attacks, such as the Sri Lankan Airport (2001), which the rebels
have not officially taken responsibility for. The site therefore acts as
a quasi-LTTE website, collecting funds through the sale of items
which, because they prove rebel responsibility for civilian deaths,
can not be sold through official sites without undermining the
organisation’s political agenda.
Breaking the government and mainstream
media’s news monopoly
The American-based tamilnet.com is clearly the forerunner in
the Eelamist alternative news campaign – utilising familiar news-
style and techniques to present ‘news’ with an underlying pro-
Eelam bias (Tamilnet, 2002b). The site claims to provide “reliable
and accurate information on issues concerning the Tamil people”.
While critics such as veteran Sunday Times defence columnist Iqbal
Athas have branded the site an LTTE front organization  (personal
communications with Athas, 2002), the site’s producers claim it
merely serves the interests of the Tamil people. The site’s editor,
another veteran defence analyst Dharmaretnam Sivaram, a former
journalist of the same newspaper group, makes no apologies for
the website’s stance, arguing that: “If the views of tamilnet are the
same as that of the LTTE, let the Sinhalese government be damned”
(personal communication with Sivaram, 2002).
Political agenda aside, tamilnet provides a solid coverage of
the ethnic conflict, regularly including news from the north and
east, which is rarely reported in traditional media due to political
pressure and inherent biases. The website gathers news through
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an extensive contributor network based throughout the island,
including the Tiger-held north and east. Sivaram himself reports
on major issues, and files his copy and digital images from the
field via laptop computer. Tamilnet is also the only Sri Lankan news
site which posts regular breaking news updates. As such, in terms
of both currency and coverage tamilnet comfortably surpasses any
web-based news-site owned by the Sri Lankan government or the
traditional media.
While tamilnet occupies the technically sophisticated non-
traditional end of Tamil nationalist media, The Tamil Guardian
utilises the Internet’s reach to distribute a more traditional media
product – a hardcopy newspaper. Readers are able to subscribe to
the hard-copy newspaper via the Guardian homepage, or read the
latest issue online in pdf format. The Tamil Guardian, published
once a week on Wednesday, operates out of three offices – one
each in the UK, Australia and Canada.
While The Tamil Guardian and tamilnet have escaped media
censorship and government control in Sri Lanka by locating
offshore, their Sri Lankan-based contributors are still subject to
political pressure. A number of journalists who have openly
associated themselves with these news outlets, such as tamilnet
editor Sivaram, are regularly targeted by opposition groups. It is
for this reason that The Tamil Guardian and tamilnet refrain from
printing reporter’s bylines. It is a sharp reminder that despite
alternative Tamil media’s efforts to break free of government
control, the continued need to protect reporter’s anonymity is an
indication they have not yet been fully successful.
On-line success of pro-Eelam media
Being present on the Internet is not in itself an indication of
success as an alternative media outlet. While there is no single
way of judging the success of a particular website, there are a
number of key indicators which can suggest ‘success’ in terms of
readership and maximisation of the medium.
The first indication is how regularly a site is accessed. This
gives an indication of how popular the site is with web surfers,
particularly when access or ‘hit’ rates are compared with other
sites of the same nature or of opposing views.
The second indicator is how sites rank on web browser search
results using key words pertinent to their subject matter.  Sites
which rank higher on search results are generally those which have
the greatest match to key word searches and are the most likely to
be accessed by those surfing for information.
A third indicator, particularly for those sites deigning to be
news and public information providers, is how credible a site is
73AsiaPacific MediaEducator, Issue No. 12/13, December 2002
KASUN UBAYASIRI:  Internet and media freedom...
considered by leading news organisations or at the very least how
significantly and regularly they are deemed a relevant news resource.
This can be ascertained either by a general survey of leading news
organisations or more simply by noting if and how often those
organisations link or reference the sites in question.
A fourth indicator is how well a group makes use of the Internet
medium. The question is whether groups exploit the potential of
the medium or whether they simply use it as a glorified newspaper
or fax machine and thus fail to attract surfers who are generally
looking for more sophisticated website features they cannot get from
hardcopy publications.  These web-specific features include: on-site
searches, easy to access archives, immediacy of news/information
coverage, relevant links to other sites - including hyperlinks within
articles to background, analysis and on-line discussion and even
immediate on-line shopping in relation to web theme.
Other indicators of success include the level of advertising a
site attracts, including advertising revenues and the calibre of
advertisers, and for sites which are accessed by subscription –
subscription numbers. However in terms of the Sri Lankan
government, traditional Sri Lankan media and Eelamist sites, these
latter indicators are either not applicable (in that they are not
subscriber-based or do not rely on advertising to survive) or are used
by only a small percentage.
In all other respects – those four indicators applicable to all such
sites, Eelamist media sites can be considered very successful, and as
this paper will discuss, are considerably more so than their on-line
traditional media and Sri Lankan government counterparts.
Each time a website is accessed, the access information is logged
on the Common Gateway Interface (CGI) which provides an interface
between the web server computer and the Internet. The information
stored in the ‘cgi/bin’ is password protected and can only be accessed
by the website owner or by an illegal computer hacker (National
Centre for Supercomputing Applications, 1998). While some
webmasters prefer to keep their ‘hit rates’ a secret, other incorporate
counter programmes on their pages show the total number of times
the page has been accessed. Counters, however, are rare in pro-Eelam
web sites.
The prominent Canadian-based pro-Eelam website
tamilcandian.com does not incorporate a counter on its homepage,
but provides a detailed ‘hit’ record for itself and its news-based
companion News.tamilcandian.com through a separate link. According
to this record, during four weeks in December 2000, the two sites
were accessed 2.4 million times, with 12.8 Gigabytes of information
downloaded – although these figures cannot be verified
Readership
And Hit
Rates
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independently.
By comparison, in the two years between 2000 and 2002, the
Sri Lankan army media page (army.lk) was accessed only 230,033
times. On-line Sri Lankan newspapers and other official Sri Lankan
sites such as the Department of Information do not have counters
on their sites.
But putting tamilcanadian.com’s statistics in perspective
further, the estimated number of Sri Lankan residents who had
Internet connections at the time of the 2.4 million-a-month figures
was estimated at just 50,000 - an extremely small percentage of
the population but a massive increase on the 14,000 people two
years earlier (news.com, 1998).
Most search engines use a program called a ‘spider’ which
‘crawls’ through the web cataloguing and ranking web sites. While
the exact algorithm of each search engine spider is kept secret,
most use a location-frequency algorithm to rank sites. In this
manner sites are graded according to the location and frequency
of a specific key word used. Therefore in most cases the sites that
are most relevant to a particular key word are listed at the top of a
search for that word.
As such the relative positioning of a web site on a search
engine can be used as a measure of that page’s success, since the
listing shows that the pages at the top are considered more relevant
by the search engine algorithms and have a higher chance of being
read by any one who performs a search for that particular key
word.
A search on three of the most frequently used search engines
– google.com, yahoo.com and msn.com (Nielsen-Netratings, 2002),
suggest pro-Eelam web-sites are relatively successful in ranking
within the first few search results, but their success is marred by a
number of missed opportunities.
Because most pro-Eelam sites focus on the conceptual state
of ‘Eelam’ and generally do not refer to the civil war in ‘Sri Lanka’.
In doing so, they miss an opportunity to rank at the top of Internet
searches for the words ‘Sri Lanka’ – which are arguably the
commonest key words for any web search on the conflict.
In 2,840,000 google search results and 2,670,000 yahoo search
results for the words ‘Sri Lanka’, pro-Eelam sites ranked extremely
poorly, with Sri Lankan newspapers, the official Department of
Information homepage and the Sri Lankan Army page ranking
considerably higher - primarily because the words ‘Sri Lanka’ are
inseparable from those web page’s theme and subject matter. The
first position of both searches was taken by Sri Lanka Web Server
which provides links to on-line versions of five mainstream
Keyword
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national newspapers – The Sunday Leader, The Island, Divaina and
the government-owned Sunday Observer and Daily News. The second
listing was the Sri Lankan government site maintained by the
Presidential Secretariat’s Policy Research and Information Unit.
While the Tiger’s official site failed to enter the top 100 in both Google
and Yahoo, it ranked 25th in msn.com, but again the government–
owned Daily News came well ahead in fifth.
However the results changed dramatically when the key words
were changed to ‘Tamil Tigers’, with eelam.com and eelamweb.com
securing the top two positions – again because of the very nature of
their sites. One anti-Tiger site, the Australian-based Society for Peace,
Unity & Human Rights in Sri Lanka (SPUR) ranked well coming
fifth. A key word search of ‘Tamil Tiger’ also proved overwhelmingly
favoured pro-Eelam sites, but a page titled ‘Eliminate Tamil
Terrorism from Sri Lanka and the Rest of the World’ - a mirror site
of the anti-LTTE sinhaya.com – managed to make it to the top of
49,200 entries in Yahoo and 45,900 in Google.
Despite Sri Lankan Tamils constituting less than 10% of the
world Tamil population, the word ‘Tamil’ also strongly favoured
the Eelamists. Tamilnet came second and eelam.com third, closely
followed by tamilguardian.com in sixth place out of 1,560,00 Google
search results and 1,690,000 Yahoo results. The results were similar
but less favourable for pro-Eelam sites on msn.com.
In a more specific word search, the key word ‘Eelam’, perhaps
unsurprisingly delivered overwhelming success for LTTE and pro-
Eelam propaganda sites - both ranking well at the top of 88,900 search
results on Google and 87,500 on Yahoo.  In both cases pro-Eelam news
sites such as tamilnet.com and tamilguardian.com ranked
significantly lower than propaganda sites such as eelam.com the
tigers official site and eelamweb.com. Mainstream and government
media failed to appear in the top 50 sites in both searches.
Interestingly in a search using the words ‘Sri Lanka Army’ –
tamilnet.com ranks third in the results.
Eelam sites and the international press
The British Broadcasting Corporation’s (BBC) on-line world
edition regularly provides a links to tamilnet.com and to the Sri
Lankan government’s priu.gov.lk, and on some occasions to both
eelam.com and eelamweb.com. In linking to these pages the BBC, which
is one of the most frequently accessed news web sites, provides yet
another opportunity for pro-Eelam sites to be viewed by readers of
the mainstream international press.
Similarly CNN.com and Associated Press also regularly provide
links to tamilnet.com and eelam.com as part of their coverage of the
Sri Lankan conflict.  Other sites which do not provide links, such as
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Agence France-Presse, Xinhua and Inter Press Service , still commonly
make reference to tamilnet.com as the key pro-rebel media
organisation – pitting it directly against the Sri Lankan government
media machine.
While none of these international media services make a
judgement on the credibility of the linked pro-Eelam sites – the
fact they consider them an appropriate and relevant alternative
to government news resources in relation to the Sri Lankan conflict,
is an indication those sites are successfully attracting reputable
news organisations to their pages and thus finding a broader forum
for their views.
In terms of mastery of Internet technology, web design and
the exploitation of the Internet medium, pro-Eelam news groups
such as tamilnet and  eelamweb.com  easily outstrip the on-line news
produced by the both the Sri Lankan government and the country’s
traditional press.
While traditional newspapers such as the Daily News and The
Sunday Observer up-load selected news stories once a day and use
the web-pages to mirror hardcopy newspapers, tamilnet.com  has
moved a step further, functioning almost as a wire service updating
its site as news breaks. Non-Eelamist Sri Lankan sites have failed
to maximise this feature of the Internet, so by recognising the
possibilities the Internet offers in terms of immediacy, tamilnet.com
producers are exploiting the medium far more effectively than
their government or traditional media counterparts.
Tamilnet.com also exploits the interactive, data storage and
retrieval capacity of the Internet in providing a detailed news
archive from 07 June 1997 onwards. It also offers a key word search
function within its archive – a function seriously lacking in
mainstream media sites. The tamilnet archive is arranged
according to the chronological order of the articles, allowing
readers to browse through article headlines of a given month and
open only the relevant pages. In contrast the government owned
Daily News and The Sunday Observer’s archives are akin to bundles
of newspaper stacked in chronological order, meaning readers
have to move from month to month forwards or backwards in a
liner scale in a bid to find a particular story – the headlines of
which are not even listed.
Another key area where Eelamist sites have successfully
employed the Internet medium well beyond the efforts of their
non-Eelamist counterparts, is in the inclusion of audio and/or
visual elements on their pages. Perhaps the most striking example
is tamiltigers.net, an unofficial LTTE site which offers readers a
selection of CNN news clips.  The clips showing Tiger related news,
Master Of
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attacks in Sri Lanka and battlefront footage add another dimension
to the site.  Similarly the unofficial site eelamweb.com makes good
use of the Internet’s audio facilities, offering sound grabs from many
of Tiger leader Velupillai Prabaharan’s key speeches.  By contrast
President Chandrika Kumaratunga’s own web page
(presidentsl.org) manages only text versions of her key speeches
and photo stills.  The same can be said for the Department of
Information.  On-line newspapers too have failed to expand beyond
the traditional static format – utilitising the web merely as another
way to read their standard hard copy product. The only major non-
Eelamist site which uses audio is that of the Sri Lankan army which
features audio links to army songs and sound bites from the army
commander.  However these links are currently unavailable.
Aside from its functions as an education or information tool,
the Internet also has a social element which offers surfers an
opportunity to browse, shop, chat and participate in on-line
activities. Being able to tap into the social aspect is also an indication
of effective use of the Internet – and again is one in which the
Eelamist sites as a whole surpass their ‘rivals’. Eelamweb.com is
perhaps the forerunner in this area, offering on-line shopping and
an on-line quiz centering around the Eelam theme. For sale are the
LTTE’s Oliveechu videos, Eelam flags, English and Tamil books on
the conflict and music CD’s. While eelamweb.com does not have a
chat room or the like, a message board is present on the
tamilcanadian.com. Comparatively none of the key government or
mainstream media sites have either discussion, shopping or
activities.
For terrorist, separatist, rebel and minority groups which have
struggled for years to find sympathetic forums for their political
views, the advent of the Internet was a gift.   It heralded the arrival
of what is effectively an uncensorable, uncontrollable information
outlet with a global reach accessible by virtually anyone, anywhere
with a home computer and a phone line.
In the case of the LTTE and pro-Eelamist groups, the Internet
offered an opportunity to make up some of the ground lost in the
Sri Lanka to the government propaganda machine and the anti-
Eelam mainstream media. Within months of the Internet revolution
in the mid-90’s, the Tigers and their supporters were online – using
new websites to deliver their separatist message to the world and
to unite their scattered diaspora.
The Sri Lankan government eventually followed suit, as did
the mainstream media, but even today, with perhaps the exception
of The Sunday Times, pro-Eelam sites are more sophisticated, more
user friendly and attract a wider audience.
Conclusion
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But while the Eelamists web-based media network easily
surpasses its anti-Eelamist rivals at a global level, it does have its
flaws – perhaps most strikingly the fact that it largely ‘preaches to
the converted’. For all their efforts, pro-Eelam sites do not have a
Sinhala language service.
Unlike the LTTE’s Voice of Tiger radio which transmits a Sinhala
news bulletin targeted at government troops, the Eelamists on-
line have failed to target the Sinhala speaking web users.
Considering the aspects of psychological warfare associated with
this type of conflict, the lack of a pro-Eelam website in Sinhala is
truly a lost opportunity.
Similarly, while pro-Eelam sites are prolific on the web they
seem to target those who are already relatively familiar with the
civil war and run the risk of failing to reach international readers
who are merely aware of the conflict but not its many nuances. In
this respect the pro-Eelam groups’ use of the web is similar to many
political and activist groups which use the web largely to reach
and unite their supporters. Their failure to rank high in a browser
search for the more used words; ‘Sri Lanka’ and their dominance
of the top results in a search for the culturally specific term ‘Eelam’
is testament that they may not be capturing as wide an audience
as they could with simply a few tweaks of wording.
While Eelamist sites as a whole have clearly proven they have
grasped the potential and the technology of the Internet through
their effective use of the breaking news updates and effective
interactive searches, there are many sites which suffer from a lack
of vision. Audio-visual elements, on-line activities and interactive
discussion successfully used by some sites, could be more widely
used by others with greater effectiveness. The same of course, could
be said of the Sri Lankan government and mainstream media.
Credibility also remains a key barrier for the success of
emerging news websites, particularly when the credibility of
traditional media services such as newspaper and radio remains
undiminished.  What bolsters Eelamist sites’ reputation as a
credible alternative news source, however, is the increasing number
of well-established news groups recognising their news worth.
While the Internet offers a ‘level playing field’ where banned
groups such as the LTTE, pro-Eelam sites, official Sri Lankan
Government sites and even anti-conflict sites such as the University
Teachers for Human Rights (uthr.org) are able to coexist on-line
without persecution and censorship, it would be misguided to
believe that those who contribute to those sites are equally free.
Despite the Government’s Chief Censor, Ariya Rubasinghe’s
threats to crack down on web-based media (International Press
Institute, 2000), on-line news-sites based outside Sri Lanka remain
out of the government’s reach.  The challenge now for those pro-
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Eelam news-sites is how to similarly put their Sri Lankan-based
reporters out of government reach while still maintaining their
commitment to promoting the Eelam cause. As seen with tamilnet
editor Sivaram, journalists working for on-line alternative media
still remain targets of government and anti-Eelam groups in Sri
Lanka.
For as long as persecution and bias continues in Sri Lanka’s
traditional media sphere, minority groups such as pro-Eelamists
will always seek less prohibitive outlets for their views.  The use of
the Internet as such a forum has been a wise move, but has failed to
impact the restrictive media system they were escaping from.  The
key aspect pro-Eelamists need to recognise now, is that by turning
to the Internet to promote their heavily biased propaganda, they
may well have given themselves a forum they were previously
denied, but have also perpetuated unbalanced poorly-veiled
publishing of propaganda.  Their criticism of a lack of balance in a
predominantly Sinhala-owned Sri Lankan mainstream media can
now be equally applied to the Tamil media on the net.
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